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Laden, at first merely a wealthy Saudi Arabian with some dedication to radical Islam, began as one such individual. Bin Laden's evolution from supporter of the Afghan covert operation to mastermind of the attacks that kicked off the war on terrorism shows in microcosm a pattern that is likely to be replicated among nations and larger interest groups. As the war on terrorism proceeds, the United States will demand certain actions, and its allies will confront distracting political forces as they face their local realities. Degrees of allied support for the new U.S. agenda will wax and wane. It is also possible that nations or groups that at one point align with Washington may later be driven to oppose its policies.
Another effect of Afghan rebel groups' pursuit of extra funds during the CIA secret war against the Soviets was the emergence of trends entirely inimical to U.S. interests. For the Afghans raising money meant dealing-not just negotiations with outside supporters, but commerce in gems and drugs. Guerrilla leaders in the interior of the country actually preferred cash to supplies in kind, which they anticipated could be freely bought in local bazaars.7 During the ciA secret war, Afghanistan became one of the world's leading producers of heroin. Not only did this fly in the face of the war on drugs being simultaneously conducted by the Reagan administration, it created conflict between U.S. agencies involved in the Afghan and drug efforts, primarily the CiA and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Ironically, when the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan after 1995, they largely eliminated Afghan opium production, but cultivation has resumed since they were overthrown by the new U.S. allies. As did the earlier secret war, the new war on terrorism is likely to lead to conflicting interests among the agencies conducting it. The U.S. government did not resolve its internal cleavages during the 1980s secret war; unresolved conflicts in a global war in the twenty-first century will detract considerably from the stated goals of the operations.
In the CiA covert operation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the United States necessarily accepted the interests of the local groups, such as drug trafficking, as a condition of their participation on our side. That fact entailed subsidiary ones: the allies had objectives different from those of the CIA or the United States; they had a different level of determination than did the United States; they had a far different attitude toward compromise than the CIA. Thus the war frequently disappeared from January to March, typically the worst of the Afghan winter. Similarly, cooperation among rebel field commanders remained sporadic at best. General Yousaf's account is replete with examples of attacks canceled because groups refused to coordinate and of even simple coordination activities aborted for the same reason. There has been much discussion recently of the phenomenon of "blowback," the tendency for actions to rebound and damage the initiator. In that regard, the CiA's Afghan campaign is obviously closely related to current events.'0 Osama bin Laden, as a rebel fighter from the cm's secret war who is suddenly at the heart of the new terrorism, is the clearest example, but indeed there are many. The term "Afghan Arab" came to denote a former fighter in the ciA covert operation who went on to other causes and affairs. In the Bosnian civil war of the early 1990s an estimated five hundred to a thousand veterans of the CiA secret war served on the Muslim side. Over the course of the campaign several thousand are thought to have participated. Afghan Arabs also participated in the civil war in Azerbaijan and in the struggle against Russia in Chechnya. Several of the terrorists involved in the 1993 attempt to car bomb New York's World Trade Center were also Afghan veterans. As the first of the cLA's
